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Abstract
Appellees, George Joyce and Alvin Leige Hutcheson were charged by information, in the
counties of Orange and Duval, respectively, with the crime of simple child abuse’ pursuant to
Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes.
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Constitutional Law: The Element of Scienter

Saves the Florida Simple Child Abuse
Statute From Being Unconstitutionally Vague:
State v. Joyce, State v. Hutcheson

Appellees, George Joyce and Alvin Leige Hutcheson were charged by

information, in the counties of Orange and Duval, respectively, with the
crime of simple child abuse' pursuant to Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes. The crime is committed by "(i) depriving a child of necessary food,
shelter, or medical treatment, willfully or by culpable negligence; and
(ii) by permitting, knowingly or by culpable negligence, the child's mental or physical health to be materially endangered." 2 Hutcheson was
charged with committing both forms of child abuse against his threeyear-old daughter,3 while Joyce was charged only with permitting
"material endangerment" of his child's health.4
Each of the appellees moved to dismiss the informations filed
against them, claiming that the simple child abuse statute is unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad. 5 Additionally, Hutcheson conI.

As distinguished from aggravated child abuse which is proscribed by § 827.03
(1975). In the recent case of Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1978), the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld § 827.03 FLA. STAT. (1975) against a challenge that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
2. State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 1978) (Boyd, J., concurred specially
with opinion). Prior to being amended in 1977, § 827.04(2) FLA. STAT. (1975), provided:
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child
to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who,
knowingly or by culpable negligence permits the physical or mental health of the
child to be materially endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084.
3. The Information filed against Hutcheson specifically alleged as follows:
Alvin Leige Hutcheson, III, on the 21st day of November, 1976, in the County
of Duval, and the State of Florida, did willfully or by culpable negligence, deprive
a child, to wit: Misty Hutcheson, age three (3) years, of the necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or did knowingly or by culpable negligence permit the physicial or mental health of said child to be materially endangered, contrary to the provisions of Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes.
Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 2, State v. Hutcheson, 361 So. 2d 406 (1978).
4. 361 So.2d at 407.
5. Id.
FLA. STAT.
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tended that the phrase "materially endanger" was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad because it did not advise the ordinary man of
specifically what conduct is prohibited by the statute.' The respective
trial courts granted each appellee's motion to dismiss, thus directly
passing upon the constitutional validity of Section 827.04(2) Florida
Statutes.7 On direct appeal8 of the consolidated cases, the Supreme

Court of Florida reversed and HELD: Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes (1975) is not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad.'
Common law required that crimes be defined with appropriate
definiteness.

0

In InternationalHarvesterCo. ofAmerica v. Kentucky,"

the United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of definiteness in penal statutes is an essential element of due process of law." This
standard was adopted more than forty years ago by the Supreme Court
of Florida in the case of Brock v. Hardie, 3 and has since been consis6. Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 2, State v. Hutcheson, 361 So.2d 406 (1978).
7. 361 So.2d at 407. In dismissing the information against Hutcheson, the
trial court stated as follows:
The statute under attack is Florida Statute Section 827.04(2), child abuse. In the
case of Winters v. State (Fla. 1977), (Case No. 49,987), decided on March 31,
1977, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the negligent treatment of children
statute, Florida Statute Section 827.05, in that the statute was vague, indefinite
and overbroad, violative of due process of law. The statute sub judice suffers the
same defects and therefore is unconstitutional on its face.
Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 3.
8. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(l) provides: "The supreme court: (1) Shall hear
appeals from final judgments of trial courts .. passing on the validity of a state statute
9. State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406, 408 (1978).
10. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1942).
II. 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
12. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides: "[Nior shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .

. . ."

See Connally v.

General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926) (application of the statute depends upon
the varying impressions of the juries; the constitutional guaranty of due process cannot
be allowed to rest upon support so equivocal); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638
(1914) (challenged statute violated the fundamental principles ofjustice embraced in the
conception of due process of law).
13. 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934). In Brock, the court in determining the
constitutional validity of a state anti-trust statute, stated as follows:
Whether the words of the Florida Statute are sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties is the test by which the statute must stand or fall, because. . . a
"statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
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tently reaffirmed by that court."
To withstand a constitutional challenge for vagueness, a penal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute.15 The statute must also set

forth ascertainable standards of guilt;"8 however, such standards must

as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."
154 So. at 694. Definiteness in penal statutes has also been held to be a requirement of
the Florida Constitution. See Steffens v. State, 343 So.2d 90 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). In
Steffens, the defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, after being convicted for
violating a municipal ordinance which prohibited, inter alia, topless waitresses and
entertainers. Id. The petition for the writ was granted and the state appealed. Id. In
holding the municipal ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague, the court stated:
The law is well settled that a penal statute or ordinance which forbids the doing
of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,Section
9, of the Florida Constitution (1968).
Id. at 91. See text accompanying note 12 supra. FLA. CONST. art. I § 9, provides: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law .... "
14. See, e.g., State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971); Zachary v. State, 269
So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972); State v. Dinsmore, 308 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1975); State v. Wershow,
343 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1977).
15. Papachristov v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); See Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
16. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). In Winters, the defendant
was charged with possessing, with intent to sell, certain obscene magazines, contrary to
subsection 2 of §i141- of the New York Penal Laws (repealed and superceded 1950)
which provided as follows:
§ 1141. Obscene prints and articles
1. A person. . . who,
2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has
in his possession with intent to sell . . . or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or
distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper
devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police
reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime; ...
Is guilty of a misdemeanor . ...
333 U.S. at 508. In determining that the penal statute was unconstitutionally vague
because there was no ascertainable standard of guilt, the court also noted that the
standard for certainty of a penal statute is higher than for a statute which relies on civil
sanctions for enforcement. Id. at 518. The Court observed, however, that the entire text
of the statute may furnish an adequate standard for certainty. Id. See also Raeback v.
New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1963) (per curiam). But see Smith v. Peterson, 313 Cal. App.
2d 241,280 P.2d 522 (1955) (the fact that the meaning of a statute is difficult to ascertain
or susceptible to different interpretations does not render the statute void).
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not be unreasonable or impossible to understand.17
Other courts have proposed additional reasons for objecting to
penal statutes which are indefinite. Some courts and commentators have
suggested that such statutes encourage the police'to rely upon criteria8
outside the statute in determining whether an arrest should be made.
Further, statutes which are indefinite or vague in effect delegate to

judges and juries the legislative power to determine which acts shall be
criminal.19

In construing penal statutes, the courts must balance two-competing considerations. 21It is well established that there is a presumption of
the constitutional validity of penal statutes 1 and that, if possible, a court
should construe a penal statute so as not to conflict with the constitution. 2 It is also well established that, where there is doubt as to the
17.

United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). In Petrillo, the defendant was

charged with violating a provision of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,
1102, as amended by an Act of April 16, 1946, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89 (1946) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1970)) which provides as follows:
Sec. 506(a) It shall be unlawful by the use of express or implied threat of the use
of force

. .

to coerce

. . .

a licensee -

(1) to employ or agree to employ in

connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any
person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such employee
to perform actual services.
332 U.S. at 3. The Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and
stated as follows: "The language here challenged conveys a definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more." Id. at 8. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
18.

See Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.

L. REv. 67, 76 (1960).
19. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 225 U.S. 81, 87 (1921) (Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the courts and juries).
20. See Brief of Appellant at 7, State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
21. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, the Court stated that,
when construing penal statutes: "[elvery presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute." Id. at 668.
22. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1977). In Gale, the
defendant was charged with selling sound on tape without the owner's consent in violation of Section 543.041(2) FLA. STAT. (1975). In upholding the constitutional validity
of the statute against an attack for vagueness the court stated:
This court is committed to the proposition that it has a duty, if reasonably
possible and consistent with constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the
validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality and to construe it so as not
to conflict with the Constitution.
Id. at 153.
PA.
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constitutional validity of a penal statute, it must be strictly construed
in favor of the accused.2
In Joyce, the appellees had argued that the trial court's invalidation
of Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes was consistent with the Florida
Supreme Court's earlier decision in State v. Winters.24 The court in
Winters had reiterated the requirements that penal statutes be strictly
construed and that their meaning should be sufficiently explicit so that
members of the community may determine what conduct is prohibited.2
In holding that Section 827.05 Florida Statutes was unconstitutionally
vague, the Winters court had observed that, under the statute, a person
with no intent to do wrong could be punished because the statute did
not require willfulness or culpable negligence as an essential element of
the offense.28 The Winters court also examined the language of the
statute concerning "necessary shelter" and observed that the statute

provided no ' guidelines for determining what specifically qualifies as
"necessary."

While acknowledging that it is not necessary to constitutional validity that the statute furnish detailed specifications of the conduct prohibited, 28 the court stated: "Such a statute is dangerous and
does not provide due process of law."2 "

23. United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209 (1937). See State v. Llopis, 257
So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971) (penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the person
against whom the penalty is sought to be imposed); Allure Shoe Corp. v. Lymberis, 173
So.2d 702 (Fla. 1965); Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977); United States v. Insco,
496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.. 1974).
24. 361 So.2d at 407. In Winters, the defendant was alleged to have negligently
deprived his seven children of "necessary shelter" by allowing them to live in an insect
infested structure which had garbage strewn on the floor, a clogged toilet and no
mattresses or bedsheets for the children. Winters was charged by information with
violating § 827.05 FLA. STAT. (1975) (superseded by §827.05 FLA. STAT. (1977)) which
provides as follows: "Negligent treatment of children - whoever negligently deprives
a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical
treatment is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084." State v. Winters, 346 So.2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1977).
25. 346 So.2d at 993.
26. Id. at n.l. The court in Winters observed that the language of§ 827.04(2) FLA.
STAT. (1975) and § 827.05 FLA. STAT. (1975) is similar but distinguished the former in
that it requires willfulness or culpable negligence as an element of the crime.
27. Id. at 993. The court pointed out that, under the language of the statute, a
palatial mansion might fail to qualify as "necessary shelter," if it had no heat.
28. Id. See Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972);
Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970).
29. 346 So.2d at 993. Boyd, J., in a dissenting opinion stated with respect to the
phrase "necessary shelter" that: "The requirement that the support be necessary to the
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In Joyce, the court distinguished its holding in Winters by stating

that the basis for its decision declaring Section 827.05 Florida Statutes
to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite was that the statute criminalized acts of simple negligence. 0 The statute under attack in Winters
did not require scienter; however, Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes,
does require willfulness (scienter) or culpable negligence as an essential

element of the crime of child abuse. The Joyce court pointed out that
3
this distinction had been noted in its decision in Winters. 1
The element of scienter or criminal intent is not always a constitutional requirement for upholding the constitutional validity of penal
statutes.3 For example, most states have regulatory statutes which
have been enacted in exercise of the state's police power. The purpose

of such statutes is usually to achieve some social betterment, rather than
to punish criminals. 3 3 Statutes which do not require scienter as an
element of the offense are considered mala prohibita 4 rather than
mala in se, 35 and such statutes have been held to meet constitutional
3

muster. 1
child prevents conviction of those who offer minimum support. Since economic abilities
of persons charged with the duty of care vary, a more specific standard cannot be
enacted. The statute is not vague." Id. at 994. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876).
30. 361 So.2d at 407.
31. Id. See note 26 supra.
32. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1928). In Balint, the Court discussed
the requirement of scienter in criminal statutes and stated:
While the general rule at common law was that scienter was a necessary element
in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to
statutory crimes . . .there has been a modification of this view in respect to
prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a
requirement.
Id. at 251.
33. Id.
34. In Coleman v. State, 119 Fla. 653, 161 So. 89, 90 (1935), the court defined
mala prohibitaas: "[Tihose things which are prohibited by statute because they infringe
upon the rights of others, though no moral turpitude may attach, and they are crimes
only because they are prohibited by statute."
35. Id. The court in Coleman defined mala in se as: "[Tlhose acts which are
immoral or wrong in themselves such as burglary, larceny, arson, rape, murder, and
breaches of the peace . . . ." 161 So. at 90.
36. Lanz v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 110 So. 522, 525 (Fla. 1926), where the court
wrote, "[Wlhen a statute makes criminal an act not malum in se or infamous without
requiring the act to be knowingly or willfully done, criminal or fraudulent intent is not
an element of the offense and need not be proven."
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The Joyce court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the constitutional validity of penal statutes which
require scienter as an essential element of the offense." Statutes making it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably low" prices with intent to
destroy competition; 8 to "knowingly" transport explosives through
congested areas, 9 or to sell meat falsely labeled "Kosher" with "intent
to defraud," 40 have all withstood constitutional challenges for vagueness
because scienter was an essential element of the offense.
In Screws v. United States," the United States Supreme Court

upheld the constitutional validity of a federal statute which was similar
to the statute under attack in Joyce in that it required "willfulness" to
commit the offense. The Court held that the statute was saved from
being held void for vagueness only because it required scienter as an
element of the offense. 2 The Court in Screws reasoned that in requiring
that the act be "knowingly" or "willfully" committed, the accused could
not later claim that he had no warning or knowledge that his act was a
violation of the law. 3 The United States Supreme Court has defined
37. 361 So.2d at 407.
38. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (selling
"below cost" with predatory intent, was held to be within the statute's prohibition
against selling at "unreasonably low" prices).
39. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (defendant was
charged with violating a statute which made it a crime to knowingly violate a federal
regulation).
40. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). In Sherman, the
defendant was charged with violating the Laws of New York, 1922, cc.580, 581 (current
version at N.Y. Agriculture and Markets Law § 201-a (1972) (McKinney)) which made
it a crime for: "[Any person, who with intent to defraud sells, or exposes for sale any
meat preparation and falsely represents the same to be Kosher." Id. In upholding the
constitutional validity of the statute, the Court stated: "[Slince the statute requires
specific intent to defraud in order to encounter their prohibitions, the hazard of prosecution which appellants fear loses whatever substantial foundation it might have in the
absence of such a requirement." Id. at 502-03.
41. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
42. Id. at 101. In Screws, the defendant, a county sheriff in Georgia, allegedly
beat a negro prisoner to death while transporting him to the county jail. Screws was
charged with violating § 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 52 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)) which makes it a crime to ".willfully subject" a person to
deprivation of his civil rights while acting under color of state law. Id. Justice Douglas,
in speaking for the majority stated: "[Tihe requirement of a specific intent to do a
prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise
render a vague or indefinite statute invalid." Id.
43. Id. at 102.
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"willfulness" as "bad faith or evil intent;"44 or as possessing a "bad
motive."'" The Supreme Court of Florida has similarly defined
"willfulness" as having an "unlawful intent."'" The highest courts of
Illinois 7 and Pennsylvania 8 have upheld the constitutional validity of
child abuse statutes similar to Section 827.09(2) Florida Statutes
against challenges for vagueness because the statutes required

"willfulness" (scienter).19

Additionally, with respect to the term "culpable negligence," the
court in Joyce noted that in the recent case of State v. Green, 0 another
44. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 398 (1933) (conduct is defined as
criminal if one "willfully" fails to pay tax, to make a tax return, or to keep required
tax records and furnish needed information).
45. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (statute made it a felony to
willfully attempt to evade a tax).
46. Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
47. People v. Vandiver, 51 Ill.2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681 (1971). In Vandiver, the
defendant allegedly beat his three-year-old stepdaughter. He was charged by information pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2354 (1969) which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person having the care or custody of any child,
willfully to cause or permit the life of such child to be endangered, or the health
of such child to be injured, or willfully cause or permit such child to be placed in
such a situation that its life or health may be endangered.
Id. at 682. The Illinois court also distinguished the statute on the basis that it required
that the act be done "willfully." Citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),
the court stated: "Thus, the statute requires more than a mere voluntary doing of an
act from which injury to health may result. This additional requirement of willfulness
has been held to avoid uncertainty which may otherwise render a vague and indefinite
statute invalid." 51 11.2d 526, 283 N.E.2d at 682.
48. Commonwealth v. Mack, 359 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1976). In Mack, the defendant
was charged pursuant to a state statute which makes it a crime to endanger the welfare
of children. Id. at 771. The statute was taken, with two minor changes, from the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 230.4 which provides: "A parent, guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a misdemeanor
if he knowingly endangers the child's welfare by violating a duty of care, protection or
support." Id. at n.2. In upholding the constitutional validity of the statute, the court
observed that the phrase "endangers the welfare of a child" is not esoteric and is easily
understood by members of the public. Id. at 772. The aforementioned statute is similar
to § 827.04(2) FLA. STAT. (1975) in that both require that the prohibited conduct be done
"knowingly." See note 2 supra.
49. Id.
50. 348 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1975). In Green, the defendant was alleged to have injured
a person by discharging a pistol. He was charged by information pursuant to § 784.05
FLA. STAT. (1975). In the opinion, the court quoted the statute which provides:
(I) Whoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another to personal injury
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
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criminal statute which required "culpable negligence" had withstood a
constitutional attack for vagueness."
The court also recognized that, in Winters, the language concerning
necessary shelter had been faulted by the court for not providing sufficient guidelines for determining the degree of deprivation necessary to
constitute a violation of the statute. Justice Boyd, in his dissenting
opinion in Winters, attacked the court's implication that the phrase
"necessary" was vague and thus violative of due process. 3 It is apparent from the record that the trial court in Duval County may have relied
upon this language in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss and in
holding Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes to have suffered the same
defects as Section 827.05 Florida Statutes in Winters." The court in
Joyce, however, stated that the language in its opinion in Winters faulting the term "necessary" was dicta and formed no basis for its holding."
The court reasoned in support of this contention that, if the language criticizing the term "necessary" shelter had been held to suffer
from the constitutional infirmity of vagueness, then its prior decision in
Campbell v. State" would have been addressed and expressly overruled
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084; (2) Whoever through culpable negligence
inflicts actual personal injury on another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
Id. at 4. The defendant argued that the general public does not understand the meaning
of the term "culpable negligence" and therefore cannot know what acts are prohibited
by the statute. The court defined "culpable negligence" as "[Tihe omission of an act
which a reasonably prudent person would do or the commission of an act which such a
person would not do." 348 So.2d at 4. The court observed that members of the public
would recognize that reckless acts, which create a risk of danger, were prohibited by
law, whether or not they understood the meaning of culpable negligence. Id.
51. Id.
52. 361 So.2d 406 at 407.
53. 346 So.2d at 994. See State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406,408 (Boyd, J., concurring
specially).
54. See note 7 supra.
55. 361 So.2d at 407.
56. 240 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936 (1971). In
Campbell, the defendant allegedly whipped and beat his seven-year-old stepdaughter.
Campbell was charged by information with violating § 828.04 FLA. STAT. (1969) (superseded by § 827.04 FLA. STAT. (1977) which provides as follows:
Torturing or unlawfully punishing children-whoever tortures, torments cruelly
or unlawfully punishes, or willfully with malice, wantonly or unlawfully deprives
of necessary food, clothing, or shelter, any person under the age of sixteen (16)
years, and whoever willfully with malice or wantonly torments or deprives of
necessary sustenance or rainment, or unnecessarily or excessively chastizes or
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in Winters. In Campbell, the court upheld the constitutional validity of
the former child abuse statute,57 which contained the phrase
"unnecessarily or excessively chastizes" against a challenge for vagueness. The Campbell court stated: "Criminal laws are not to be considered vague simply because the conduct prohibited is described in general
language."58
Next, the court dealt with appellee Hutcheson's contention that the
term "materially endanger" was also unconstitutionally vague. The
word "materially" was defined by the Court as "to an important degree" and "endanger" was defined as "to expose to danger." 59 In holding that the terms were not unconstitutionally vague, the court reasoned
that the statute prohibits conduct which, in a significant way, permits
the physical or mental health of a child to be exposed to danger. 0 The
court then held that this language was sufficiently clear to inform men
of common understanding of the conduct prohibited by the statute. 1
Finally, the court held that Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes is
not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad 2 and, in an effort
to clarify its prior holding in Winters, the court once again emphasized
that its criticism of the term "necessary" was dicta where inconsistent
with its holding in Joyce. 3
Justice Boyd, concurring specially, noted that he had dissented in
Winters because of the court's treatment of the term "necessary" and
also stated: "I am happy to see the Court, today, recede from language
in Winters which, at the very least, intimates that in matters of child
mutilates his child or ward, or whoever willfully with malice or wantonly deprives
such child or ward of necessary treatment and attention is guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two
years or by fine not exceeding- two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or both.
Id. at 299. The court held that the words complained of "unnecessarily or excessively"
were not unconstitutionally vague when considered with the entire text of the statute.
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the United States Supreme Court held
that where a statute is uncertain, the entire text of the statute may provide the standard
of certainty needed to defeat a constitutional challenge for vagueness. See also State v.
Lindsey, 284 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1973).
57. 240 So.2d at 299.
58. Id.
59. 361 So.2d at 408. The court cited WEBSTERS NEw 20th CENTURY
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957) when defining both terms.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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abuse a standard of what is 'necessary' for a child's welfare is too vague
to apprise the public of unlawful conduct.""
In State v. Joyce, the Supreme Court of Florida implicitly recognized that "there are some areas of human conduct where legislatures
cannot establish standards with great precision.""5 Child abuse is one
such area. There is growing concern among the general public with
respect to acts of child abuse. Public policy demands that children be
protected from abuse. However, the specific acts which constitute child
abuse are often difficult to articulate in statutory terms. The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid prosecution pursuant to criminal statutes which are vague. In Joyce the court
left intact an effective tool with which the state protects the welfare of
its children. The court also hastily clarified its misleading and ambiguous decision in Winters in order to prevent other courts from mistakenly
following in the steps of the Orange and Duval County Courts. The
Supreme Court of Florida, while not addressing the issue of whether a
person can be convicted of violating Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes
by culpable negligence alone, has determined that if the acts of child
abuse are done willfully, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.
Edward J. Culhan, Jr.
64. Id. (Boyd, J., concurring specially with opinion).
65. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 556, 581 (1974).

Published by NSUWorks, 1979

11

